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ANGOLAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1992

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ABSTRACT

The current research focuses on Angola in terms of its location and demographics. Reference is made to the period during which Angola had been exposed to Portuguese colonialism, then the outbreak of Angolan civil war 1975-1991. A long conflict exposed the country to severe human and economic losses that no other African country witnessed.

The research also examines the extension of the Angolan civil war during 1992. This period was described as a period of neither war nor peace. When the United Nations, Portugal, Russia, and the USA tried to implement "Bicesse Accords" to end the conflict, it couldn't be achieved. UNITA had continued its policy of procrastination and clashed with the Angolan government in several battles throughout the country in 1992. In this conflict, thousands of the country's population had been killed, civilian and military, as well as the country economy was exhausted

INTRODUCTION

The study of Angolan political developments 1992 is regarded as one of the most important subjects which deserves scholars' search due to Angola's importance in terms of its strategic location, and because it had witnessed the longest civil war in African continent as it broke out 1975, and continued for later years and had dangerous consequences in relation with Angolan society.

The research study consists of an introduction and two sections. The introduction is entitled **Angola until 1991**: in this part, the researcher shows its geographical location, its demographic composition, and what it had suffered during the colonial period that lasted four centuries. Then, the researcher revealed the civil war's breakout within the years 1975- 1991, as we referred to the international interference through the Cold War frame which contributed in its emergence. The reference to this topic is important for any

reader to get to know Angola, and the reason for its devastation. First section has come under the title “implementation of Bicesse Accords 1992”: in which the researcher explains the developments that accompanied the implementation of Bicesse agreement during that period, as well as its impact on the country. The second section held the title “collapse of Bicesse and outbreak of the war in 1992”: in which the researcher dealt with the outbreak of the Angolan civil war between (UNITA) and (MBLA) governments, in addition to the impact it had cast on the country, as well as the United Nations’ attempts to stop the conflict.

The research study relied on a number of important foreign sources, including: Orphan of the Cold War the inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process 1992-1993, by Margaret Joan Anstee. The importance of this book comes as the author was an eyewitness to the developments that occurred in Angola, as she was a member of the United Nations Mission in Angola, the book had enriched the research with important information in several aspects. Other sources are: Angola A modern military history 1961-2002 by Stephen L.

Weigert, which is one of the important books because the writer is a contemporary of Angolan events, again this book enriched the research with valuable information in several aspects. In addition, the research had relied on other foreign sources that enriched the research with information in several aspects due to the valuable information it carried on the Angolan events.

Finally, I sincerely hope that I have made a modest contribution to provide new information for the reader who is interested in Angola.

Preface: Angola until 1991

Angola is located in southern part of the African continent. It is bordered by the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) to the north, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) to the northeast, Namibia, to the Southern east, Zambia to the southern east⁽¹⁾, and the Atlantic Ocean with a 1,600 km long coastline to the west⁽²⁾.

The country's name is derived from the name of Ngola, the leader of Mbundu tribe, who managed to unify it, and established the medieval kingdom of Ndongo. The name's means (a small piece of iron symbolizes strength)⁽³⁾. Angolan society includes about a hundred tribes, but most of these belong to four main ethno linguistic groups, namely⁽⁴⁾. Ovimbundu, Umbundu, Bakongo, and Cokwe⁽⁵⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Shawqi Abu Khalil: The world countries' Atlas, Thought's House, Damascus, 1998, p. 135; Robert I. Rotberg, Angola, Harding House publishing, Harvard, 2002, p.11.

⁽²⁾ Philip Rafla: African political geography, translated by, EzzEddin Farid, 2nd Edition, Egyptian Renaissance Library, Cairo, 1966, p. 591; George Wahba Al-Afi: Journey around Africa, National House Press, Cairo, W.D. p. 31.

⁽³⁾ Joseph C. Miller, Kings and Kinsmen early Mbundu states in Angola, Oxford University Press, London, 1976, pp.58-64; Lawrence W. Henderson, Angola: Five centuries of conflict, Cornell University Press, London, 1979, p.81.

⁽⁴⁾ Richard Gibson, African liberation movements: contemporary struggles against white minority rule, Oxford University Press, London, 1972, p.200; Leroy Vail, The Creation of tribalism in Southern Africa, Berkeley, London, 1989, p.380.

⁽⁵⁾ David Seddon and Daniel Seddon Daines, A political and economic dictionary of Africa, Routledge Haines House, London, 2005, p.33.

The official language is Portuguese, in addition to the local dialects that are currently spoken, which are Umbundu, Kimbundu, Kioku, Kwanuha, Kikongo, Ngangela, and Chokwi ⁽¹⁾ As for the religion, most Angolans embrace Christianity along with paganism, while Muslims form a very small percentage ⁽²⁾.

Portugal turned its attention to Angola since the beginning of the geographical exploration movement for the abundance of its resources and it was able to control the coastal areas in 1575 after battles with the Kingdom of Ndongo ⁽³⁾.

Portuguese colonialism continued until 1975. During colonial period three movements had appeared in Angola: the popular movement for the liberation of Angola (MPLA), which is a Marxist leanings movement and got the support of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), those were capitalist oriented supported by the U.S.A and western countries against Portuguese, but those three movements were competing and disputing with each other, because their ideological orientation which led to conflict among them during the struggle against Portuguese. In 1975 Portugal had to grant Angola its independence due to the escalation of African movements and the turmoil that occurred in it, according to Alvor agreement, which is signed by the three movements in January 1975, this agreement determined the Independence Day to be at 11 November in the same year. Before the announcement of the independence officially, civil war had broken out among these three movements at the beginning of 1975, whereas (UNITA), and (FNLA), had fought together with an American and western countries' support, while (MPLA), had obtained the Soviet Union support, as well as Cuba, and socialists countries. (MPLA) had achieved success and took power in November 11, 1975. In 1976 (MPLA) government had obtained recognition from a number of countries in the world, which strengthened its position. In the same year the U.S.As topped supporting the (FNLA), movement which was headed by Holden Roberto, because it lost confidence in him. The movement become inactive, and Holden Roberto had to solve it, and gave up the conflict with (MPLA) government in 1978, his movement turned to be an opposite party to the Angolan government, which it had no activity. But (UNITA), headed by Jonas Savimbi had insisted to continue its conflict, because the U.S.A and number of western countries were directed their support to the movement which led to continuation of the conflict until the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991. After the American and Soviet sides agreed not to interfere in Angola ⁽⁴⁾, negotiations took place under the auspices of Portugal in Bicesse which lies southern Portugal. Negotiations had ended on the 31st of May 1991 with the conclusion of Bicesse agreement signed by Dos Santos, President of the

⁽¹⁾ Guus Meijer, from military peace to social justice: The Angolan peace process, Conciliation Resources, London, 2004, p.4 ; Joseph C. Miller, op. cit, pp.37-40.

⁽²⁾ Bernd Wiese, Africa geographie, Munchen Press, Munchen, 1985, p.210; David Seddon and Daniel Seddon Daines, op.cit, p.33

⁽³⁾ David Abshire and Michael Samuels, Portuguese African, Pluto Press, London, 1969, p.176.

⁽⁴⁾ Margaret Joan Anstee, Orphan of the Cold War The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process 1992-1993, Macmillan Press LTD, London, 1996, pp.7-10; Martin Rupiya, Evolutions & Revolutions A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa , 2005 , pp.8-28.

Republic of Angola, and Jonas Savimbi, leader of (UNITA), under the supervision of the Portuguese government, in the presence of representatives from the Soviet Union, the United States of America, and the United Nations. This agreement had stipulated the following items:

1. The commitment of the Soviet Union and the U.S. not to interfere in Angolan internal affairs, not to sell weapons to the conflicting parties, and the custom of "triple zero".
2. The commitment of the Angolan government and (UNITA) to ceasefire, whereas (UNITA) had to recognize the Angolan government and Dos Santos as president of the country. In return the government will recognize (UNITA) as a democratic political party ⁽¹⁾.
3. Demobilization of both sides' forces, and formation of a new national army consisted of forty thousand fighters, divided between them, no later than the first of August of the same year.
4. Holding free and democratic elections during the 29th - 30th of September 1992, whereas the winning party will form a new government.
5. The exchange of prisoners of the two parties under the supervision of the International Committee of Red Cross.
6. The agreement shall be implemented under the supervision and monitoring of the Second United Nations investigation Mission in Angola ⁽²⁾.

Despite reaching an agreement, the U.S.A did not recognize the Angolan government, and Jonas Savimbi continued agreement's violating several times during 1991, while (UNITA) continued to kill some government officials, and carried out bombings and clashed with government forces in several places throughout the country, as well as it did not surrender her weapons ⁽³⁾.

Section one

Implement of Bicesse Accords 1992

When Bicesse Agreement was concluded, it was decided that it would be implemented with help and control of the U.S.A, the Russian Federation, Portugal, and a United Nations force, in cooperation with a joint committee of (UNITA) and (MPLA) government. America had pledged to pay an American grant counted 40 million dollar to help the peace process ⁽⁴⁾. As a result The Angolan President announced on November 1991 that the elections would take place on its specified date in 1992. In addition, the Angolan government had gone a long way in abandoning Marxism-Leninism, and had taken steps in

⁽¹⁾Dorina A. Bekoe, *Implementing of peace agreements: lessons from Mozambique, Angola and Liberia*, Fifth Avenue, New York, 2008, pp.61-62; Martin Rupiya, *Op.Cit*, pp.28-29.

⁽²⁾William Minter, *Apartheid's contras an inquiry in to the roots of war in Angola and Mozambique*, Zed books, London. 1994, pp.53-54; Margaret Joan Anstee, *op.cit*, pp.10-11; Stephen L. Weigert, *Angola a modern military history 1961-2002*, Martin's Press, New York, 2011, p.100.

⁽³⁾ For More Info, see: Khalaf Obaid Hamood Eldulaimi: *The American Soviet position on the Angolan civil war 1975- 1991*, Unpublished PhD thesis, College of Education for Human Sciences, University of Babylon, 2017, pp. 275- 277.

⁽⁴⁾ Christopher Pycroft, *Angola The Forgotten Tragedy*, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, Published by Taylor & Francis, Ltd, (Jun , 1994), p.249.

adopting free market economy, was making preparations for elections ⁽¹⁾, and it was taking action to implement the democratic system at the beginning of December 1992, by sponsored a multi-party conference. The conference's tasks were to consult with the opposition parties on matters of mutual interest. Ten parties attended the conference, and no representative of (UNITA) had attended due to Jonas Savimbi's refusal because he did not want (UNITA) to be the same as other opposition parties in the same scale. He believes that the (UNITA) position is equivalent to the (MPLA) government, because (UNITA) had signed the Bicesse agreement. Savimbi stated at the conference that (UNITA) had held official talks with (MPLA) government with an international sponsorship. The conference's agenda was to discuss the election law to establish the National Electoral Council, the role of foreigners in monitoring elections, forming of political parties' Act, and the media role. During the deliberations, a number of party representatives suggested holding a sovereign national conference to establish a new political system, but the governmental (MPLA) party had opposed this proposal on the grounds that its applying would undermines the current Angolan constitution and Bicesse agreement⁽²⁾.

With these developments, some events had occurred that contributed intensify the situation between the Angolan government and Savimbi's forces. At the beginning of January 1992, seven British tourists had passed from southern Angola to Namibia, where they were attacked, four of them were killed. (UNITA) forces were accused of killing them. What raised suspicion about them, that (UNITA) had prevented a joint committee of Angolan government and United Nations from investigating the incident. (UNITA) leadership had declared later that the operation was randomly carried out by a group of (UNITA) aiming to steal without Jonas Savimbi's knowledge. Despite that, the incident caused a disturbance in relationship between the government of Angola and UNITA ⁽³⁾.

In addition, at the beginning of 1992 (UNITA) was cracked by disputes within its leadership ranks. An escalation of tension resulted by the escape of Tony da Costa Fernandes, (UNITA's) Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Miguel Nzau Puna, Minister of Interior, from the party headquarters in Gamba to Lisbon, and they were officially announced Defection from (UNITA) in March of the same year. Poona had stated that Savimbi had hidden 20,000 fighters and would declare war if he lost the elections, he also declared that the defection was due to a violation of human rights. (MPLA) was accused of inciting dissent, but the matter's fact was that Savimbi executed Tito Chingunji, the former (UNITA) representative in Washington with Fernando Wilson dos Santos, along with their families on 12 August 1991, they were accused with (UNITA's) treason and defaming the president of (UNITA) abroad to overthrow him, Or the attempt to poison him in Gamba, that was the main

⁽¹⁾ Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch /Africa, Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections, Human Rights Watch, New York, 1994, p.10.

⁽²⁾ George Wright, *The Destruction of a Nation United States Policy Towards Angola since 1945*, Pluto Press, London, 1997, p.162; Margaret Joan Anstee, op.cit, p.87.

⁽³⁾ Margaret Joan Anstee, op.cit, p.49.

reason for the escalation of disputes that ended in dissent and weakened the leadership of (UNITA) ⁽¹⁾.

With those developments, the Angolan government was working to prepare for the elections. It has passed several legislations, including protection of right of expression, right of demonstration, right to strike, the press's freedom and the abolition of restrictions imposed on domestic travel, as well as the curfew and allowed the formation of non-governmental organizations, including commercial and professional association, Business associations, environmental committees, women's organizations, youth, charitable organizations and associations, in addition to open the way for international non-governmental organizations that worked in cooperation with state agencies, and local, non-governmental Angolan organizations. This was in addition to the emergence of political parties that started practicing their political activity. In 3 April 1992 election's Act was passed. This Act included the formation of a National Council for Elections, it had authorized to register voters and educate electoral. The Act had defined the rules of election campaign, its financing, elections' management, their results announcement, and to solve the problems regarded electoral disputes or fraud ⁽²⁾. The Western diplomatic circles, and even some of the supporters of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) expected that party would collapse in the elections due to the voters' desire to get rid of the hegemony of one party, and the rampant corruption among a number of officials in the MPLA party ⁽³⁾. As for the Portuguese circles, they believed that (MPLA) was in a state of chaos and was trying to gain time to transfer its funds abroad, that the elections would not take place specified date at all, and that the authority would transfer to (UNITA) ⁽⁴⁾.

With Angola heading to hold the first elections in the country, the main government task in 1992 was the implementation of the provisions of Bicesse Agreement, which focused on two main tasks: the first was demobilizing the Angolan government army along with (UNITA) army and forming a national army, while the second lies in withdrawal of (UNITA) forces from the territories they control and handing them over to government forces to establish security there. All this must be done before the elections. With regard to the task of demobilizing the forces of the two conflicting parties according to Bicesse Agreement. That is to be done and form a unified national army ⁽⁵⁾ with a strength of 40,000 fighters, which means each party will provide 20,000 soldiers to form a new national army as well as the formation of an air force consisted of 6,000 combatant, a naval force of 4000 fighters, and this was scheduled to take place before the elections to be hold in September 29-30 of the same year ⁽⁶⁾.

⁽¹⁾ George Wright, *op.cit*, pp.164-165; Stephen L. Weigert, *op.cit*, pp.108-109.

⁽²⁾ George Wright, *op.cit*, pp.160-165.

⁽³⁾ Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch /Africa, *op.cit*, p.10.

⁽⁴⁾ Margaret Joan Anstee, *op.cit*, p.90.

⁽⁵⁾ Dorina A. Bekoe, *op.cit*, pp.64-65.

⁽⁶⁾ Stephen L. Weigert, *op.cit*, p.106.

Number of forces to be demobilized and incorporated was 120,000 fighters belonging to the Angolan government and 65,000 fighters belong to (UNITA) forces. These forces were to be assembled in special gathering areas to carry out the mission ⁽¹⁾, but the implementation faced several problems, including insufficient funds and supplies to build sites to assemble the forces of two parties, which led each of them to keep their forces and redeploying them, as the government deployed 15,000 fighters in Cabinda to confront the separatist movement in Cabinda, while that force was among the forces that should be demobilized. Savimbi presented 37,330 fighters for demobilization and announced that the remaining number ranges between 10-12 thousand fighters who were demobilized, now they are working in the political wing of (UNITA), and there is another section who deserted from military service, according to United Nations reports announced in mid-1992 confirming that 85% of (UNITA) forces was only at the assembly headquarters, and what had demobilized of them was only 4% at a time when the Angolan government demobilized 37% of its forces, which raised the United Nations mission's concern. It continually confirmed the risks of this action, as well as, differences emerged between the two parties regarding the formation of the police force, as (UNITA) requested the integration of 7-8 Thousands from its forces in the new police forces. The government of Angola refused this request because it decided to form a new police force contains 4000 policemen only. In addition it had announced its approval to include 1,200 of (UNITA) in its ranks, but what entered its ranks were 183 of (UNITA) fighters under the pretext that (UNITA) soldiers don't have full identification documents. With the formation of the Anti-riot force which was known as the (Ninja) Force, this force included 1,000 demobilized fighters, this had sparked a dispute between the two parties ⁽²⁾, because the Bicesse Agreement didn't provide the formation of Anti-riot force(s (Ninja), and the government has used that force to defend it in the event of its demobilization. When that force appeared, (UNITA) began to refrain from demobilizing its forces, hide its weapons, did not hand it over to the government, and Savimbi considered the Anti-riot force (as a second parallel army, and the establishment of that force deemed a violation to the triple zero clause that prevented any country from supplying arms to Angola, as Spain trained and armed Anti-riot force), while the Angolan government had believed that it had the right to develop that force. The United Nations did not object the power of Ninja, and asked the government to use it only in times of crisis. Savimbi requested to confined the Anti-riot force (to be a special barracks, then he demanded the inclusion of a number of (UNITA) forces alongside with Anti-riot force), but the government did not allow this, and agreed to include (UNITA) forces in the National Police only and in a limited number, which complicated the demobilization procedures between the two parties ⁽³⁾.

The Canadian Police Monitoring Force which belong to the United Nations Mission had submitted a report on 8 April 1992, indicating its concern about

⁽¹⁾ Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch /Africa, op.cit, p.13.

⁽²⁾ Stephen L. Weigert, op.cit, pp.106-107.

⁽³⁾ Dorina A. Bekoe, op.cit, pp.72-73.

the process of government forces and (UNITA) demobilization due to the lack of progress in this regard, and confirmed that, at 15th of the same month, the Angolan government had demobilized about 48.66% of its forces, while (UNITA) demobilized about 6.45% of its forces, and this indicated a violation of Bicesse agreement, while (UNITA) leadership had confirmed that the reason behind this action was some problems which they had to face including the lack of civilian clothes, the lack of sufficient funds to demobilize the fighters, as well as the lack of identification papers for a number of fighters, and the lack of media transportation due to the difficulty of reaching remote areas ⁽¹⁾.

What fueled the dispute the most was what Western intelligence did, which claimed to have discovered there are number of senior (MPLA) leaders conspired to assassinate Savimbi in June 1992, in response Britain sent a special air service to Savimbi to protect him, in order to ensure the peace process and not to derail its proper course⁽²⁾. This was followed by the clashes of the Ninja forces with (UNITA) in Huambo, Savimbi's residence at August 6, 1992. (UNITA) had accused the Angolan government that it was trying to kill Savimbi before the elections. The leadership of (UNITA) also announced and denounced that the Angolan government had obtained a shipment of weapons from Spain for anti-riot forces which regarded as breach to Bicesse agreement, in same time (UNITA) had got weapons from Israeli suppliers. That situation had complicated the second mission of United Nations ⁽³⁾.

The failure of demobilize the two sides forces had several reasons, whereas there were effectively reasons had contributed to the failure of demobilization, as the delay regarded the implementation of demobilization were happened for several reasons, including transportation to the assembly areas, which was a major obstacle due to the lack of transportation, the lack of food and medicine in the gathering areas, and the poor residence there, which led to flight a large number of fighters who were accompanied by their families to their homes. Then the forces number that assembled were exhausted. In addition, civilian clothes were not provided to demobilize fighters, but the important reason is the lack of confidence between the two parties, which led to demobilization's procrastination ⁽⁴⁾.

Thus, the responsibility for the failure of demobilization and forces integration falls on the Angolan government and (UNITA) together for the lack of cooperation between them through demobilization process. Both secretly violated Bicesse Agreement. The government had created an Anti-riot force (Ninja), which was in contravention of the agreement, while (UNITA) had delayed its forces demobilizing process and constantly were complaining about the lack of guarantees for employment, food and housing, as well as they did not allow to use their trucks to transport the forces. It withheld their

⁽¹⁾ Margaret Joan Anstee, *op.cit*, pp.51-52.

⁽²⁾ Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch/Africa, *op.cit*, pp.10-11

⁽³⁾ Stephen L. Weigert, *op.cit*, p.107.

⁽⁴⁾ Esref Aksu, *The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative change*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2003, p.162; Dorina A. Bekoe, *op.cit*, p.70.

trucks from international inspections, as well as the responsibility is fallen of United Nations and the international community due to remaining silent about the violations that occurred ⁽¹⁾.

On 24 June of the same year, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, had stated that he had deep concerns about the political and security situation in Angola, in which the situation is still tense, as well as the incomplete demobilization, and as a result, Margaret Anstee, who headed the United Nations Mission in Angola, made an official complaint to the United Nations, explaining the situation in Angola and announcing it to the media, despite of that interest, the United Nations Investigation Mission in Angola did not effectively and accurately investigate (UNITA)'s non-compliance to the demobilization process, and did not announce the behavior of international community organizations in Angola. Moreover, Bush administration, which continued its secret support for (UNITA) in order to win the elections, did not put pressure on (UNITA) to complete the demobilization process, and justified this by not having sufficient funds to support the creation of a new Angolan national army ⁽²⁾. In July 1992 Margaret Anstee had traveled to Washington to ask for US help in obtaining a loan, and a C-130 transport plane to push demobilization process within July and September, and was able to obtain that assistance ⁽³⁾. Angolan government quickly demobilized its forces while (UNITA) was keeping about 90% of its forces in the assembly areas. This raised Angolan government's suspicions, which assured the United Nations mission that (UNITA) maintains 20,000 troops hidden in the regions of Mexico, Gamba guerrilla warfare's headquarters of (UNITA) forces near the Namibian border, and attempts to demobilize recruits continued, with the deadline of 31 August 1992. But to no avail. On the 19 of the same month, Savimbi stressed the need to completely dissolve the Angolan government forces in order to fully demobilize (UNITA) forces. In response, Angolan President dos Santos announced on 21 August of the same year that the demobilization should include the full forces of both sides, and it was both sides maintain armed forces, and this was accompanied by the emergence of another problem, which is the transfer of weapons into the hands of civilians loyal to both sides, with the elections approaching, the task of completing the forces' demobilization of the two sides became a difficult problem. On 3 September of the same year, the Angolan Foreign Minister declared that the complete demobilization of the forces had become impossible before the election date, and he directed a stinging criticism against (UNUTA's) leadership, as he confirmed that it has the full intention to go to war if it fails. In the elections, he attributed the reason for this to (UNITA's) delaying the demobilization of its forces, leaving large numbers of (UNITA) forces that had been demobilized in the assembly areas, and had not been transferred to areas under government control, and declared his fear of a new bloodbath in Angola ⁽⁴⁾. On 7 September of the same year, a meeting took place between Savimbi and the Angolan President dos Santos, where the two parties agreed finally to

⁽¹⁾ Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch /Africa, op.cit, p.14.

⁽²⁾ George Wright, op.cit, p.166.

⁽³⁾ Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch /Africa, op.cit, p.14.

⁽⁴⁾ Margaret Joan Anstee, op.cit, pp.52-57.

dismantle the two parties' forces and to form a new national army. The date 27 September 1992 was set as the deadline for that process, but Savimbi continued not to demobilize (UNITA) forces and did not comply with that⁽¹⁾. With the arrival of the elections in September 1992, (MBLA) government demobilized nearly 96,000 soldiers, who represent about 80% of the total Angolan forces, as for (UNITA), only a third of its forces were demobilized.

UN officials in second investigation mission had repeatedly emphasized the risks behind the flawed demobilization process ⁽²⁾. In addition, President Dos Santos sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in which he stressed his concern about a new war that (UNITA) might launch, and about the movements of forces trying to station strategic locations in the country, and he criticized the UN mission, because it didn't control all this actions⁽³⁾. The demobilization process was virtual and the UN mission was unable to control the situation due to the limited of its staff number and lack of funding ⁽⁴⁾.

As for the second task that was supposed to be implemented according to the Bicesse Agreement, it was to impose security throughout the country by deployment of government forces there, along with (UNITA) forces' withdrawal from all areas, but (UNITA) did not allow it ⁽⁵⁾. By June 1992 (UNITA) allowed the government to reach 500 towns Out of 600 towns, and by pressures for peace, the number of towns under(UNITA's) control decreased. In September, the same year, 52 towns were under the control of (UNITA). This led to confusion in the voter registration processes, which were inaccurate and unsatisfactory, especially in the major provinces Moxico, Cuando Cubango, and Uíge ⁽⁶⁾. (UNITA's) vision lies in: that placing all areas under government control would make them lose power in challenging the government and render them vulnerable against it ⁽⁷⁾ What made matters worse is what the Front for the Liberation Cabinda's enclave, as it intimidated about two-thirds the population of Cabinda, and it prevented them from registering in voters registry of in order to participate in elections, which violated the Bicesse Agreement and the mission of the United Nations ⁽⁸⁾.

Before elections' arrival, both (MPLA) and (UNITA) expected to win the elections, but the leadership of (UNITA) had moved part of its forces to Huambo and became fully prepared for war. A large number of (UNITA) forces that were integrated into the Angolan army and police, numbering 4000 fighters, had fled and joined (UNITA) in order to fight. Angolan government had become in a difficult position ⁽⁹⁾, Due to inability of its newly formed

⁽¹⁾ Stephen L. Weigert, *op.cit*, p.109; Dorina A. Bekoe, *op.cit*, pp.70-71.

⁽²⁾ Stephen L. Weigert, *op.cit*, p.107.

⁽³⁾ Margaret Joan Anstee, *op.cit*, p.58.

⁽⁴⁾ Anthony Clayton, *Frontiersmen: Warfare in Africa since 1950*, UCL Press Limited, London, 1999, p.148; Martin Rupiya, *op.cit*, p.30.

⁽⁵⁾ George Wright, *op.cit*, p.160.

⁽⁶⁾ Stephen L. Weigert, *op.cit*, p.108.

⁽⁷⁾ Dorina A. Bekoe, *op.cit*, p.65.

⁽⁸⁾ Stephen L. Weigert, *op.cit*, p.108.

⁽⁹⁾ Martin Rupiya, *op.cit*, pp.31-32.

forces which counted 8000 fighters to confront (UNITA) forces, at the same time, it cannot defend Angola against any external aggression ⁽¹⁾. In the face of this, the Angolan government moved its forces in September of the same year to important areas, including Malanje, it was eager to protect it, fearing that (UNITA) forces might infiltrating there. Those forces spread rumors against the UN mission, portraying them as to be loyal to (UNITA), and (UNITA), had made the same in order to be blame in the event that one of the two parties failed in the elections. Situation between the two parties became tense, and became ready for confrontation and fighting ⁽²⁾.

This was an indication to the failure of United Nations mission to achieve its objectives, to prevent the Angolan conflict due to its limited number, the money to finance it, and the mandate, as it was restricted in taking decisions. Portugal, Russia, and the U. S. A. were observers of Bicesse agreement's implementation, but they did not have a real effective role alongside the United Nations mission to prevent the conflict, and didn't push both (UNITA) and the Angolan government to implement the agreement's terms ⁽³⁾.

By September of the same year, with election date's approaching (UNITA's) popularity among voters decreased and had become opposite to Western expectations that favored Savimbi's victory. The government's propaganda campaign contributed to get this result, along with Savimbi's speeches in his election campaign in which he attacked whites in Angolan government, where he stressed that (UNITA) will purging everyone who supported the government after it win. This frightened many urban voters and employees who were dependent for their livelihood on their job, and convinced a lot of people to disregard (UNITA's) election, coincided with (UNITA's) arrogant style of erecting barriers in cities and harming the population which led to a significant decrease in its popularity ⁽⁴⁾. What contributed to the decline of (UNITA's) popularity was its electoral rhetoric which was devoted to A fimbundu ethnic group, in order to gain power and manage the state's resources, which mean it did not have a comprehensive vision for all the Angolan nation. This led voters to alienate it. (MPLA) was at the contrary, as it abandoned the tribal beliefs in its speech, and directed its election rhetoric to all the Angolan people, including the Avimpondo, which led to an increase in its popularity in the elections⁽⁵⁾. When the United States felt this, it tried to ensure the existence of (UNITA) in power. On 8 September U.S.A had made an arrangement with the Russian Federation and Portugal to persuade the Angolan President dos Santos to share power with (UNITA) in case they failed in the elections. On 8 September, Portugal had announced the readiness of dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi to form a national unity government, regardless of the election result. The next day dos Santos had declared that if (MPLA) won the elections, it would form a national unity government, in the same time Savimbi made a same statement, but (UNITA) had continued

⁽¹⁾Stephen L. Weigert, *op.cit*, p.109.

⁽²⁾ Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch Africa, *op.cit*, p.11.

⁽³⁾ Guus Meijer, *op. cit*, p.18; Dorina A. Bekoe, *op.cit*, p.63.

⁽⁴⁾ Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch /Africa, *op.cit*, p.12; George Wright, *op.cit*, pp.166-167.

⁽⁵⁾ Eric Morier Genoud, *Sure road? Nationalisms in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique*, Martinus Nijhoff Pubshers, Leiden ,2012, p.205.

violence's acts. On 20 September, (UNITA's) forces burned three government cars in Bie Province, occupied the airport in Quito and threatened to shoot down any aircraft trying to land there. In addition, before the elections, it was announced of army number which formed, it was 8,800 fighters out of 40,000 fighters, according to what was determined by Bicesse agreement ⁽¹⁾.

Elections had held in its exact time in September 1992, participated by 18 political party which didn't have any prominent role in that elections. The main rivalry was confined to (UNITA) and (MPLA), which regarded as the largest contending parties⁽²⁾. The result come with the victory of Eduard dos Santos, a candidate for (MPLA), with 49.57% of the vote, and Jonas Savimbi, candidate of (UNITA), who had got 40.7%. According to that result, People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) won 54% of the seats in the legislature, in return, (UNITA) had got 34%, thus (MPLA), held 129 seats in parliament out of 223 seats, compared with 70 seats for (UNITA). As for the rest of seats, they were divided among ten parties that participated in the elections, including (FINLA) party which was led by Holden Roberto. The Participation in the elections was 91% of the registered voters' number, which amounted to 4.4 million voters. According to Angolan law, the failure of the presidential candidate to obtain more than 50% of the vote requires a second round of elections, but this did not happen due to the withdrawal of Jonas Savimbi, and his rejection to election's results on 5 October, accusing the government of fraud and threatening to declare civil war and withdraw (UNITA) forces from the joint army. To face this situation, UN put pressure with number of Western countries to delay the election results until 10 October, they had recounted and audited the votes. 18 committees were formed in all provinces to re-counted and checked the electoral records, and the ballot boxes, but the results were identical ⁽³⁾. As a result, the European Commission and African Unity Organization announced in official reports that the results of the Angolan elections were correct, that the elections were fair impartial and free of fraud ⁽⁴⁾.

Also, the United Nations Authority announced on 17 October that the elections were impartial, conducted without fraud, and were fair. However, Jonas Savimbi questioned these results and rejected the United Nations' statements and the election results ⁽⁵⁾. He accused the (MPLA) government of deploying armed personnel in (UNITA) electoral sites, which had its effect on voters, that the government smuggled filled ballot boxes and replaced them with 55 ballot boxes, especially in Huila and other places, as well as not opening a number of polling centers and closing others before the end of the election time. He also accused the (MPLA) government of allowing Pro-Namibians to cross the border and cast their votes in favor of (MPLA). In the province of Kuando Cubango. 19 of Angolan government spokesmen had

⁽¹⁾ George Wright, op.cit, p.167.

⁽²⁾ Esref Aksu, op.cit, p.163.

⁽³⁾ Human Rights Watch, Angola unravels the rise and fall of the Lusaka peace process, New york, U.S.A, 1999, p.16; Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch /Africa, op.cit, pp.12-18; Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, pp.251-252.

⁽⁴⁾ George Wright, op.cit, p.169.

⁽⁵⁾ Guus Meijer, op. cit, p.20.

responded, and all (UNITA) allegations were refuted, in turn (UNITA) was accused of sabotage and violence, including an attack on the national radio station and the killing of a police officer there near Savimbi's home in Luanda, and armed (UNITA) militants were accused of disrupting polling stations in Malang and Mexico. But these mutual accusations did not affect the election result. Angolan president had achieved outperformed on his competitors in 14 Angolan provinces out of 18 provinces, while his rival Savimbi achieved an advantage in the provinces affiliated to (UNITA) namely Huambo, Kuando Cubango, Bie and Bingla, and this refuted (UNITA) allegations of election fraud in the southern regions ⁽¹⁾.

The (MPLA) drew its electoral support from the Kimbundu people in the provinces of Luanda, Bengo, Malang and Kwanza Norte, as well as the support of the main ethnic group Bakongo, which is concentrated in the Northwest Frontier region, the province of Zaire, which was the backbone of Finla movement supporters which led by Holden Roberto. The elections, the majority of the Bacongo chose (MPLA) surprisingly, especially the groups affected by the war with UNITA, while UNITA got its electoral support from the ethnic group Avimpondo in Huambo and Kuando Cubango, Cubango, Benguela and Bie. (UNITA) had lost votes in the provinces of Cunene, Lunda Sul, Namibe, Moexico and Zaire, despite having supporters there because people from those areas were underrepresented in the leadership of (UNITA)⁽²⁾.

The collapse of Bicesse and the outbreak of war, 1992

Faced with the threat of civil war, the Angolan government quickly returned its forces which consisted of officers and soldiers, that had been discharged from the service and began to form effective combat military units in order to control the situation after the weakness of its strength due to demobilization ⁽³⁾.

As for the (UNITA) forces, which were organized and divided on in several axes, led by the most brilliant commanders of movement, which consisted the Northern Front that includes the provinces of Wiji and Zaire led by General Dembo, while Kwanza Norte, Bingo was under the command of General Numa. As for Malang Front, it was under the leadership of General Chimoco, as well as Northeastern Front which included the provinces of Moxico, Seoul, and Lunda Norte were led by General Nyembam and Eastern Front, which included Moxico, and the central front, which includes practically Benguela, Bie, Kwanzaul, Huambo and Huila, was led by Jonas Savimbi personally assisting by a number of prominent (UNITA's) officers. Finally the southern front was opened later in 1994. (UNITA's) commander in chief was Jonas Savimbi, his deputy Dembo, while the Head of (UNITA's) Operations, Brigadier General António Manuel, while commander of General Command

⁽¹⁾ Stephen L. Weigert, op.cit, p.110.

⁽²⁾ Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch /Africa, op.cit, p.12.

⁽³⁾ Martin Rupiya, op.cit, p.32.

was General Ben Ben, as for (UNITA's) Chief of Staff, it was General Sapalalu Bok, while Deputy Minister of Defense, General Chilingutila, who had regarded as UNITA's largest military tactical commander. (UNITA's) directorates were organized with its departments and branches ⁽¹⁾. (UNITA) took advantage of the ceasefire period and infiltrated its forces into towns and cities that they were unable to reach before the 1991 ceasefire. This gave UNITA forces a strong advantage in the event of the outbreak of civil war, as they were able to achieve gains in controlling the areas that were held by the Angolan government, the government whose forces were restricted, in order to implement the terms of Bicesse Agreement, and to avoid entering into a new conflict ⁽²⁾.

After the failure of the elections, the spark of civil war was began with the spread of rumors that (UNITA) was plotting a coup in Luanda, and the government took measures in self-defense. On 2 October, 1992 (UNITA) had increased its forces to guard Savimbi at his residence in Luanda. Those forces began to expand in the areas surrounding the residence, put up roadblocks, and practiced arrogant behavior. On 3 October, tension escalated between (UNITA) and Angolan government. On 6 November, senior (UNITA's) officers and their forces withdrew from the army, which the government had integrated, at the same time, Jonas Savimbi left Luanda secretly for Huambo, and on 9- 10 October, Savimbi received the UN representative in Angola, Margaret Anstee, at her headquarters in Huambo to discuss the election results and (UNITA's) position on the government. (UNITA) forces were spreading, and fires were increased between them and the government forces in Luanda. Clashes continued, threatening peace with war's danger ⁽³⁾. The United Nations, U.S.A and other countries have appealed to Jonas Savimbi to respect Bicesse Agreement, accept the election results, and refrain from acts of violence and war. However, Jonas Savimbi didn't respond to this appeals, and (UNITA) escalated violence during the month of October in Luanda, Huambo, Cuando Cabango, Huila, Bibi, Lunda Norte, Lunda Sol, Uíge, Moxico, Zaire and other regions of Angola ⁽⁴⁾.

(UNITA) forces were preparing for war across the country, and they launched an early attack on 8 October, 1992 on the city of Caconda in Huila province and managed to occupy it. Three days later, on the 11th of the same month, a bomb exploded in a car outside a hotel in Luanda where (UNITA's) officials were live in. Government officials had denied responsibility for the blast, but confrontations soon erupted between (UNITA) and supporters of (MPLA) and the Ninja policemen. On 17 -18 October, UNITA attacked had positions of the Angolan forces in Huambo, butwere deterred. On 19th of the same month, Jonas Savimbi issued a statement through radio station rejecting the United Nations statements that the elections are free and fair, affirming his desire to hold talks with the (MPLA), government to find solutions to the bad situation in which Angola is living, praying to God called that (MPLA) leaders will

⁽¹⁾ Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch /Africa,op.cit,pp. 25 -26.

⁽²⁾ Christopher Pycroft,op.cit, p.252.

⁽³⁾ Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch/Africa,op.cit,p.66.

⁽⁴⁾ George Wright,op.cit,p.168.

have the ability to find appropriate solutions to avoid a renewed outbreak of a new war. On 23 October of the same year, talks began between a delegations from (UNITA) and (MPLA's) government that lasted for nearly a week in order to agree to form an interim government, where (UNITA) have positions in it. However, those talks were interrupted by the massacres that took place in Luanda, which (UNITA) called at a later time as (The Massacre of All Saints) ⁽¹⁾. On 30 October 1992, thousands of (UNITA's) fighters had spread Disguised as civilians in the capital, Luanda, that force had attacked Luanda airport, the capital's police headquarters, the police headquarters and the presidential housing complex. In addition to that UNITA deployed 10,000 fighters outside the capital, this attack was interpreted as a coup's attempt to control the government and the Angolan armed forces ⁽²⁾.

This was a pretext for (MPLA) government to carry out a massacre against (UNITA) members. Soon, violent clashes began between the Ninja police forces and (UNITA) members and extended to include all the streets of Luanda. On 31 October and 1st November, they turned into fierce battles in Luanda between the two parties. The (MPLA) government had previously distributed weapons to its civilian supporters who joined the police and military forces against (UNITA), on 2nd November, government forces managed to expel (UNITA) members from Luanda, and a number of (UNITA) leaders were captured, while 1,200 people were killed⁽³⁾, most of which were from (UNITA), including politicians, soldiers, and supporters in the capital.

This massacres affected even the voters of both parties ⁽⁴⁾. Among the dead were Savimbi's nephew Elias Salupeto Pena, who was considered his right hand, and Savimbi's deputy, Chitunda Jeremias. Many had believed that the incident was a suicide attempt by (UNITA) in order to overthrow the Angolan government and reach power. The Angolan government forces managed to control the situation in Luanda with great difficulty ⁽⁵⁾. (UNITA) responded had come on the 2nd November by attacking Caxito, the capital of Bengo province, which lies north of Luanda. UNITA forces were able to control it after the withdrawal of governmental army and police forces from it ⁽⁶⁾, as well as, (UNITA) had managed to control the capitals of some provinces, including Ndalatando and Mabanza Congo to the northwest. Meanwhile, government forces bombed the headquarters of Savimbi, Huambo, for a full day ⁽⁷⁾.

Soon after, battles took place in several areas, including Lubango, Benguela, Quito Cuanavale, Lobito, Caxito, Namibe, Benguela, and Huambo. Government couldn't control it easily, (UNITA) had had significant military activity in eastern and southeastern Angola due to the support of Zairean

⁽¹⁾ Stephen L. Weigert, *op.cit*, pp.111-112.

⁽²⁾ George Wright, *op.cit*, p.169.

⁽³⁾ Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch/Africa, *op.cit*, p.19.

⁽⁴⁾ Guus Meijer, *op. cit*, p.20.

⁽⁵⁾ Anthony Clayton, *op.cit*, p.148.

⁽⁶⁾ Christopher Pycroft, *op.cit*, p.252.

⁽⁷⁾ Stephen L. Weigert, *op.cit*, p.112.

soldiers and mercenaries ⁽¹⁾, It also had depended on the ethnic group to which the Avimpondo belonged, which constituted 40% of the total population of Angola, as for The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola(MPLA) which represent the government, it also depended on the ethnic group to which the Umbundu belonged, which constituted 23% of the population of Angola, and the refusal to abandon ethnic affiliations was a major reason that fueled the continuation of the civil war ⁽²⁾.

The international community had ignored that conflict and did not try to prevent it to resort to negotiations, while the two conflicted parties considered it unleashed on them in order to seize power by force ⁽³⁾, but the United Nations managed on 3 November to ceasefire in the capital. However, this quickly collapsed due to the continued fighting of (UNITA's) forces in separate areas of the country in the north, center and south, in the same time, Angolan government forces destroyed (UNITA) offices in several cities, in addition several senior (UNITA's) leaders were killed, whereas quantities of (UNITA) weapons were destroyed in an attempt to weaken (UNITA) and force it to negotiate, but the government's attack did not succeed in weakening (UNITA) and developing its hostile spirit against the Angolan government. Fighting had continued. On 4th November 1992, it managed to take control of Bengo, 30 miles from Luanda, in the same time (UNITA) forces launched an attack on Kwanza Norte and managed to control it, Besides battles were going on in the central regions of Angola, in which it was able to control several regions, including the province of Wiji, in the north of the country ⁽⁴⁾.

As a result, Margaret Anstee made efforts to stop the fighting and revive Bicesse Agreement and was able to persuade the two conflicted parties to negotiate. On 26 November 1992 negotiations took place between (UNITA) and the Angolan government in Namibia which lies to southwestern coast of Angola, and the two sides agreed to implement the Bicesse agreement ⁽⁵⁾, work to cease fire, and that the two parties would allowed to expand United Nations mission's role in Angola, as well as the international role to preserve peace. On 28 of the same month in a statement, Jonas Savimbi announced that (UNITA) must accept the elections' results of 30 September 1992, and members of (UNITA's) party must assume their positions in Parliament and the government. On 29 November 1992, he accepted to fulfill Namibian pledges. With these developments, (UNITA's) forces had occupied Wiggi and Negage in the northern part of the country under the pretext of responding to the provocations of (MPLA) government forces. On 1st December, of the same year, Jonas Savimbi initiated the restoration of peace with a pledge to Margaret Anstee to withdraw from the two regions, but the officials refused to accompany the UN mission's personnel to the two regions to ensure the withdrawal of Savimbi forces from them ⁽⁶⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Anthony Clayton, *op.cit*, p.148.

⁽²⁾ Esref Aksu, *op.cit*, p.156.

⁽³⁾ Guus Meijer, *op. cit*, p.20.

⁽⁴⁾ Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch /Africa, *op.cit*, pp. 19- 20.

⁽⁵⁾ Guus Meijer, *op. cit*, p.30; George Wright, *op.cit*, p.170.

⁽⁶⁾ Stephen L. Weigert, *op.cit*, p.112.

With the continuation of these developments, President Dos Santos formed his new government on 2 December 1992, after which a national unity government included 11 members from other parties, and the government proposed Ministry of Culture to (UNITA), in addition to four deputies in other ministries in an attempt to convince it to negotiate and avoid war ⁽¹⁾. Jonas Savimbi had expressed his agreement and nominated members from (UNITA) to fill those positions. However, the Luanda government responded that (UNITA) members could only assume these positions when (UNITA's) rebels complied with provisions of Bicesse agreement, allowing the government to extend its central administration to all rural areas, which led to a tense situation between (MPLA) government and (UNITA), in which, it had managed to control 90 towns out of 164 until late November 1992, and continued its battles with government forces. By December of the same year, (UNITA) forces were able to control two-thirds of the country's urban centers.

The government responded by sending military forces, police forces, and a large number of armed civilians to the besieged areas in Malang, Benguela, Quito, Luena and Huambo. On December 28, government forces had attacked (UNITA) sites in Caxito to ward off the danger against Luanda. In the aforementioned areas, violent battles took place between the two sides, in which large numbers of people were killed. The death toll had estimated ten thousand Angolans on both sides during November and December 1992, among them a number of unarmed civilians ⁽²⁾. With all these events, Bush administration were supporting (UNITA), and devoted its efforts to include (UNITA) in a national unity government and didn't blamed it for the events that took place in Angola and the breach of the agreement. UNITA also obtained the support of Zaire and South Africa, and this was a clear violation of Bicesse agreement ⁽³⁾.

At the end of 1992 (MPLA's) government took advantage from the split that occurred in (UNITA's) ranks due to the flight of number of its senior soldiers and officers who joined the Angolan armed forces against (UNITA). (MPLA) government had honored them by giving them ranks comparable to their ranks in the Angolan army. This deemed as a gain for the Angolan army due to the defector's 'knowledge of (UNITA's) forces' tactics, logistical work, communications, and intelligence. This provided a new advantage for the Angolan military forces, which they used in the battles against (UNITA), and it achieved an advance on the battlefields, while Jonas Savimbi relied on a new class of middle-ranking of (UNITA) officers who he trusted their loyalty to him ⁽⁴⁾.

The hope of the Angolan people was lie in getting rid of the devastation that inflicted the country as a result of the civil war which lasted 16 years and left devastating effects on the social and economic reality in the country, which

⁽¹⁾ Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Human Rights Watch /Africa, p.cit,p.20.

⁽²⁾ Stephen L. Weigert, op.cit, pp.112-113.

⁽³⁾ George Wright,op.cit,p.170.

⁽⁴⁾ Stephen L. Weigert, op.cit., p.116.

was in dire need of reconstruction in rural areas, roads, bridges, schools, homes and hospitals. However, what happened was that the Angolan government directed its resources to hold elections, and to cover Ministry of Defense's expenses, to complete the demobilization process and create a unified army. When the elections failed, it directed its resources to confront (UNITA), which shaped a calamity for the Angolan people who remained suffering from death and poverty ⁽¹⁾.

It should be noted that (UNITA) had obtained U.S.A's support of in 1992 under the pretext of humanitarian aid. It continued its dual policy through contacts with (MPLA) government, and its supporting to (UNITA). The administration of George Bush Senior provided secret aid to (UNITA) which had estimated about 6 million dollars through the Central Intelligence Agency and from the funds which had allocated for the fiscal year 1992. These aids was transferred by non-governmental organizations through Namibia illegally, and the Bush administration claimed that this aid was for food, the provision of services in the areas controlled by (UNITA), to help them to move into civilian life. That aid was part of 40 million dollars provided by U.S.A to aid Angola, The Bush administration had stressed that the Angolan government would not be recognized until after holding free and fair elections. It is worth noting that liberal US Congressmen have expressed their opposition to Bush's policy towards Angola ⁽²⁾.

From what have mention above, it is clear that neither Angola's government nor (UNITA), movement were working seriously in order to achieve peace in the country, and this is evidenced by their failure to implement the provisions of the Bicesse agreement, and that the role of the United Nations was weak and unable to follow up on the implementation of the agreement, in the same time it remained silent in the face of the violations that took place, especially preventing external interference. The secret aid from America, South Africa and other countries to (UNITA) was an encouraging factor for it to continue to violate and not implement the agreement. In return, the government did not commit to implementing some important provisions, and that spoiled the peace process.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The divisions within Angolan society led to a long struggle to gain power, whereas (UNITA) organization, led by Jonassavimbi, hadn't really a true tendency to build a democratic system in the country, but rather its desire to impose its control on the country by force, and to exploit its resources for the benefit of its supporters, which spoiled the peace process.
2. No correct basic rules were set for parties' work, which led to emerge ineffective parties in Angola to compete with (UNITA) and (MPLA). The competition between them had receded and was linked to elections' results that caused the conflict.

⁽¹⁾ Christopher Pycroft, op.cit, p.250.

⁽²⁾ George Wright, op.cit, pp.161-162.

3. The election date set according to the Bicesse agreement which give more than a year, and that cleared the way for (UNITA) to friction with government forces several times, and resulted the loss of confidence between the two parties, and then affected the implementation of the provisions of the Bicesse agreement.
4. United Nations' role was weak in Angola, and it did not have a decisive role in the political aspect, which led to the outbreak of conflict in Angola.
5. The role of the countries that were monitoring the implementation of the agreement, namely Portugal, U.S.A and Russian Federation, was not sufficient to deter the conflict, as was the case for African regional countries that did not have a clear role in bringing about Angolan peace.

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