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### THE MEDIATION OF ALEXANDER HAIG TO AVOID AN ARGENTINE-BRITISH MILITARY CLASH OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 2-30 APRIL 1982

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#### ABSTRACT

The Falkland Islands are one of the most prominent crises in the history of Argentina, as the dispute over those islands lasted for nearly two centuries, Argentina claimed sovereignty over those islands while their administration was under the control of Britain, which generated a heated political conflict between the two sides, as that conflict reached its peak in 1982, due to the failure of the negotiations that took place between Britain and the Argentine military council at that time on the eligibility of sovereignty over the islands. Abandoning either of them, so Washington intervened to solve the crisis and avoid a military clash between the two parties, and that task was entrusted to US Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who sought to find a solution that would spare the two countries a military war, but his mission failed in the end, which led to the occupation of the islands by Argentina. On April 2, 1982, the Argentine-British Falklands War took place.

#### Introduction

On April 2, 1982, Argentina occupied the Falkland Islands, and the Argentine military junta declared its sovereignty over them, which left the US administration confused, because Argentina is Washington's ally against communism in Central America, while Britain is the closest ally of the United States of America in NATO.

Therefore, it was necessary for the American administration to prepare to resolve the crisis between the two countries before the occurrence of a war that might cast a shadow on American-European relations. Therefore, Reagan decided that the United States of America should intervene as a mediator between the two sides. This task was undertaken by the American Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who launched To solve the crisis between the two countries with a trip he called (the shuttle flight), during which he tried to mediate and made all political efforts to avoid war, but his mission failed in the end because of the intransigence of the two parties and their claim of sovereignty over the islands. Accordingly, the research was divided into two main topics.

### **Literature review**

#### **First: The position of the US administration on the Argentine occupation of the islands**

*The position of the US administration on the Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands, April 2-7*

On the night of the Argentine invasion of the islands on April 2, 1982, Alexander Haig informed all the diplomatic missions of Latin American countries that Argentina had occupied the islands without facing any significant resistance, as the number of British soldiers was few, and Haig's telegram carried a great condemnation of the invasion The Argentine and asked Argentina to withdraw military forces from the islands quickly, while Britain, for its part, cut diplomatic relations with Argentina and wrote an urgent report to the Security Council in the United Nations asking the council to vote on obligating Argentina to withdraw its forces from the islands (Maureen, 2015). After the request was submitted by Britain, Nicanor Costa Mendez, the Argentine foreign minister, rushed to Washington in order to obtain support within the Security Council, and not to vote on the British report, as he tried to win the efforts of Washington representative Kirkpatrick and a strong supporter of the Argentine junta, but that The United States of America could not do that, as there was almost unanimity that Argentina had made a mistake by using military force (Max, 1987), Jean Kirkpatrick (Peter, 2012), the representative of the United States of America at the United Nations, was unable to contradict the international consensus on the hostility of Argentina, which made Mendes turn to the representative of the Soviet Union in a secret meeting, through which he tried to push Moscow towards vetoing The decision issued, as it served to remind the representative of the Soviet Union to break the grain embargo and the previous trade cooperation between the two countries, but Argentina's support for the United States of America in Central America, and the war against the Sandinista forces in Nicaragua prevented that, so the Soviets were satisfied with not voting only, in When they did not use the veto and preferred to keep it, and as a result, the Security Council passed the next day, on 3 April 1982, Resolution 502, which stipulated obligating Argentina to withdraw all its forces from the Falkland Islands (Peter, 2012), The vote of the United States of America in favor of Britain in the Security Council would not have passed without Argentine action towards it, as a number of high-ranking government figures in Argentina informed the US Embassy in Buenos Aires of their concern about what the US administration has done in the UN Security Council and voted to On the part of Britain in Resolution 502, they informed the embassy that this matter could generate

a great reaction and resentment among the Argentine people, especially in light of the great national upsurge, and this would harm the relationship of the two countries (FRUS, 1982). As a result, Foreign Minister Hague summoned the Argentine ambassador in Washington, Esteban Arpad Takacs, and explained to him that the United States of America was forced to vote in favor of Britain, but this did not change the depth of the relationship between the United States and Argentina, and after the discussion between the two parties ended, told him that he should remind Argentine President Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri (Harris M, 2013) that Britain is an important ally of Western countries in the fight against communism, as it stands in the ranks of Argentina and the United States, and that the recent military move may harm the public interests of the three countries. And British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (David, 2016) moved the British fleet on its way to the islands, and whenever it reached a close distance, it was difficult for her to stop it, as a result of the internal pressures she was exposed to, and finally asked him to cooperate to solve the crisis before it happens. The military clash between the two sides, which causes a great loss to the Western world (FRUS, 1982). In the context of the same events, the British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington (Daniel, 2018) submitted his resignation from his position on April 5, and Francis Leslie Pym (John F, 2008) was appointed to replace him after he announced that bearing him responsible for the failure of the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, and in turn this resignation made the United States of America feel threatened for fear of Thatcher's resignation, which is subjected to great popular and parliamentary pressure, so the American administration had to move quickly to prevent this from happening (FRUS, 1982). Accordingly, Hague met with the Argentine Foreign Minister in Washington, after he was invited to visit the United States of America in an attempt to calm the existing situation. It would allow both sides to save face" (FRUS, 1982), meaning that no party would lose before public opinion, but the Argentine Foreign Minister was stubborn in his opinion and told Hague that he could not give up the victory that Argentina achieved by occupying the islands, and if this resolved it is done by stopping the advance of British forces towards the ocean, and then declaring Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands (FRUS, 1982). Events.... Since we did not want to avoid a major setback to our policy in the Western Hemisphere) (FRUS, 1982), In response, Reagan directed the meeting of the US National Security Council on April 7, 1982, in order to reach a conclusion that would solve the crisis between the two sides. Senior political figures in the Reagan government, and during the meeting, a dispute occurred between Thomas Enders, the Under Secretary of State for American Affairs and Jane Kirkpatrick, and Lawrence Sidney Eagleburger (Ramiro, 2016), Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bernard, 2011). The dispute centered on which country Washington should support. "It would be madness to sacrifice our advances in the Western Hemisphere and antagonize Argentina for the sake of some islands," Andrews said. "Mr. President, I have nothing." No doubt, this is the most serious crisis you have faced in your presidency so far, but Argentina is a very important partner in the security of the Western Hemisphere and we simply cannot abandon them.... We also have important relations with the Organization of American States, to which Argentina may resort, which will constitute pressure on us and our relations with those countries (FRUS, 1982). These

proposals provoked Eagleburger, who interjected, "I want to point out my opposition to Landers and Kirkpatrick, as it is the most wrong thing I have ever heard! I am here to say that we have nothing but the support of our British allies to the fullest, since we are bound to them only by historical ties, ethnicity, language, law, and tradition." Rather, we are connected to them by the fears of the Cold War, the depth of intelligence contact, and the strategic importance, unlike Argentina, which fluctuates in our relations with them....and who guarantees that Argentina will continue its relations with us for the next ten or fifteen years) (FRUS, 1982), Based on the foregoing, it becomes clear the depth of the difference and the political conflict that the Reagan administration entered into, and perhaps a large part of this conflict of opinion is based on the previous policy and the Argentine-American relations, as Eagleburger showed a key point, which is the possibility of continuing relations with Argentina, a country that did not His relations with the United States are never stable, and even after the secret alliance against communism brought them together, it quickly became apparent that Argentina turned to the Soviet, Washington's great political enemy, in order to obtain a veto in the Security Council, which raised Eagleburger's fears and demanded Britain's support. Accordingly, Alexander Haig proposed a compromise solution that satisfies all parties, as he asked President Reagan to enter the United States of America as a diplomatic mediator between the two parties and to seek a negotiated solution that would avoid the two countries from armed military confrontation. To discuss the problem and this was eventually approved, as the White House announced after the meeting that Reagan had instructed Secretary Haig to mediate between the two countries in order to reach a peaceful solution to the South Atlantic crisis (FRUS, 1982).

**Second: Alexander Haig's mediation to avoid a military clash between the two countries.**

*Alexander Haig mediation to avoid a military clash between the two sides April 7-30* Hague left Washington on April 7, heading to Britain on his so-called "shuttle flight." On his arrival in London, he met with Thatcher and Beam for five hours, and after meeting the two he wrote to Reagan in a secret telegram, "That Thatcher harbors evil in him." Its teeth, and was ready to use force against Argentina)), as it was not ready to negotiate with Argentina unless the military council withdrew its forces from the islands immediately, and this is one of the basic conditions for Thatcher, along with restoring the British administration on the islands, which she pledged to implement before the British Parliament (FRUS, 1982), Accordingly, Hague presented his proposals, which he carried from Washington, which he felt were close to Thatcher's conditions, and these proposals were, the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the islands, and the appointment of an interim administration for them by the two parties besides the United States of America, in addition to the resumption of negotiations to reach a peaceful solution, However, Thatcher vehemently rejected the issue of the interim administration, as she considered it a violation of British sovereignty, and accordingly Hague wrote to Reagan, "Thatcher eventually responded to a peaceful solution, but she rejected the interim administration, and I will travel tomorrow to Buenos Aires with no disclosure of Britain's intention In the peaceful solution in order to put pressure on the military council and to reach a quick solution) (FRUS, 1982), On April 9 Hague's plane arrived in Buenos Aires, and before he met the Argentine

president in a formal meeting, he sent his escort Vernon A. Walters, at five in the evening, to meet with the Argentine president and set some important points for the conversation to be held in the evening, as Walters mentioned to Galtieri that he was able to unite his people in a way that no one before him could do, then told him ((In return, if you can return the Falklands without war and without firing a single bullet, history will record that and you will be seen as a leader of the free world and a man of peace)) (FRUS, 1982), he was This meeting is a prelude to trying to persuade Galtieri to listen to Hague's efforts and to withdraw the troops from the islands, but Galtieri replied, "The only thing you cannot ask of me is to withdraw the Argentine flag. If I do, I will be expelled from this building." , you must work on something that fits this matter)) (FRUS, 1982), Based on the foregoing, Galtieri explained to Walters that the great popular support he obtained from the occupation of the Falklands may turn against him overnight if he decides to withdraw from the Falklands without a military or diplomatic victory, and his priorities are Argentine sovereignty over the islands, so it becomes clear that the decision to withdraw the Argentine army Of the islands, it is no longer in the hands of the military council alone, and this leads to the increasing difficulty of Alexander Haig's task in reaching a peaceful solution. In the evening of the same day, Hague met with the Argentine president, after the Plaza de Mayo was filled with supporters of the military regime in the matter of the conquest of the Falklands, and who refused the mediation of Hague, which demanded withdrawal from the islands, and in his meeting with Galtieri, Hague tried hard to convince him about the seriousness of the British military action against Argentina, as well. He explained to him that the United States of America was under pressure to support Britain, its ally in NATO, as the Argentine army continued to control the islands (FRUS, 1982), On the other hand, Galtieri replied to Hague that sovereignty over the islands is not up for discussion, and he also told him that Cuba had offered Argentina its military support and perhaps it had spoken on the tongue of the Soviets, and that the military council might be forced to adopt this support if Britain took military action, and that was a kind of threat The veiled Hague and Britain as well, and in the end, Hague managed to convince Galtieri to withdraw the Argentine army from the islands, in exchange for a joint temporary administration by Washington, London and Buenos Aires, hoping to convince the British side to do so (FRUS, 1982). Despite the agreement that was made between the two sides, Argentine Foreign Minister Mendes handed Hague a paper containing some conditions contrary to the agreement before leaving Argentina for London, and then told him that it carried his own ideas, and in fact it carried the ideas of the Military Council, and among these conditions is the confirmation On the sovereignty of Argentina through the stay of an Argentine ruler on the islands during the period of negotiations, as well as the attempt to end the sovereignty negotiations in favor of Argentina for a period ending on December 31, 1982, in return the military council pledges to act by Resolution 502 and withdraw the army from the islands, and of course these options were not acceptable By Britain, which in turn complicates and hinders Haig's mission (Alex, 1992). As a result, Hague wrote to Reagan in a secret glimpse about the difficulty of his negotiations with the Argentine side, telling him that the military council had stirred up the people's national enthusiasm, until it got out of control and therefore they did not allow themselves even a small space for political maneuvering or

negotiation, and that any concession by Argentina might lead to to overthrow them, and this is certainly what the Argentine military junta completely excludes (FRUS, 1982). Following this, Hague arrived at London airport on April 12, certain that the British side would reject all of Mendes' proposals, and when he met Thatcher and Bem, what he expected was correct, as all Argentine proposals were rejected at all, and even Hague's proposals for a joint administration of the islands and the resumption of negotiations It received little support, and this support was conditional on the implementation of Resolution 502 and the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the islands (FRUS, 1982), While in London, Hague was in constant contact with the Argentine side, who in turn came back to present him with another proposal, which seemed better than the previous proposals. Mendez told him that his government would not insist on the survival of an Argentine ruler, but rather the retention of the Argentine flag only during the negotiations, in exchange for Britain's recognition (of ending Colonialism) on the islands, and perhaps this simple détente was an Argentine response to the declaration of the European Common Market countries to impose an economic embargo on Argentina on April 11, 1982, in support of Britain and to stop all kinds of dealings with them (FRUS, 1982). Despite that, Mendes requested some guarantees from Haig. Until the Argentine proposal was officially announced, it included that the British fleet limit its movements in the ocean, as well as a request from Hague for a pledge that the American administration would not provide any military support to Britain in the future (FRUS, 1982). Accordingly, Hague presented the new Argentine proposals to the British side, but Thatcher had set a prerequisite for decolonization, which is (the freedom of self-determination of the Falklands people), meaning that he chooses the rule of any of the two countries, as Britain was certain that self-determination would work in her favor, and this is absolutely rejected by Argentina because it will end any Argentine claims to sovereignty over the islands in the future (FRUS, 1982). Accordingly, Hague found himself in a dead end in the negotiations between the two parties, and this made him angry, especially with the Argentine side, as he called the British Foreign Minister, Francis Beam, and told him: "Mendez is evading right and left. On the islands, it then complicates matters further) (FRUS, 1982). The next day, Hague met again with Thatcher, and told her that the Argentine foreign minister was not steadfast on a certain decision, at the time when he demanded sovereignty over the islands, he returned to ask me to continue the negotiations as well, so it is unfortunate that we cannot reach a conclusion in light of these changing attitudes (FRUS, 1982). As a result, Hague became frustrated with the volatile position of the military council, which does not want to reach a solution, and this was confirmed by Thatcher in her memoirs, as she mentioned that Hague had suspended his efforts announcing his return to the United States of America, but this was not an announcement that his mission had ended because he was wary of That the crisis opens a door for the intervention of external parties to influence Argentina, and he singled out the Soviets, so he felt the need to find a peaceful solution and get out of the current crisis (FRUS, 1982). Thus, after holding a press conference in London, Alexander Haig returned to Washington on April 13, and then presented a paper prepared at the State Department to President Reagan, which contained all the difficulties and problems he faced with both sides, especially with the Argentine side, as he showed him the extent of

Galtieri's stubbornness and submission to pressure The great popularity of his country, then all these things contributed to the failure of Hague's first shuttle flight and his diplomatic endeavors between the two countries (FRUS, 1982). In the context of the same events, the Soviet moves became more effective during the mediation of the United States of America and as part of the Cold War conflict, as the Soviets began to promote in the media that Washington supports Britain at the expense of Argentina, and that its mediation between the two parties is a formal mediation, as Moscow claimed that the United States gave light The green of Britain for the war on Argentina and the duration of the secret intelligence and military effort, and in return Washington sought to obtain a military base in the Falklands, which somewhat undermined the US claims of equitable mediation between the two parties (Ramiro, 2016), This coincided with the growing fear of the United States of America that the military council might obtain Soviet support, especially after the economic embargo imposed by European countries on Argentina, as one of the CIA reports confirmed on April 15, 1982, that the only winner of the British-Argentine conflict was the union The Soviet report also stated ((that Argentina may see itself compelled to accept the Soviet military assistance in the event of war, and that this assistance was actually offered to Argentina, in addition to the fact that the Soviets seek to reduce the danger of Argentina in Central America by approaching them ))( FRUS, 1982), As a result, Reagan himself moved in order to refute all the allegations of the Soviets, as he called President Galtieri on April 15, and explained to him, "All that has been promoted in the media regarding sympathy with Britain is untrue, since we are committed to the same distance towards the two sides." He also touched on the depth of the relationship between the two parties, especially in anti-communism, and then informed the Argentine president that Haig would be sent again in order to complete the negotiating task, asking the Argentine president to cooperate and show restraint in order to reach a peaceful solution (FRUS, 1982), Accordingly, Haig wrote to Reagan before heading to Buenos Aires that he might face big problems from the Argentine military council, which adheres to the issue of sovereignty, which in turn may end the path of negotiations. (FRUS, 1982), Accordingly, Hague continued his second shuttle trip, arriving in Buenos Aires on April 16, and met with President Galtieri and Minister of Foreign Affairs Nicanor Mendes, where he conveyed to them President Reagan's concern about the outbreak of military actions between the two countries. Among the solutions he had prepared after drawing the results of his previous visit to London, and among these solutions was to keep the Argentine flag raised on the islands, and to expand the role of Argentina during the transitional period, as well as to ensure the conclusion of negotiations before December 31, in addition to lifting European economic sanctions and guaranteeing assistance The United States of America to Argentina throughout this period, in exchange for that, Argentina withdraw its military forces immediately from the islands, and resume negotiations with Britain on the basis of self-determination, and then Hague asked President Galtieri to discuss these proposals within the Military Council and to respond to it in the evening of the same day. FRUS, 1982), It is clear from the foregoing that the US Secretary of State has realized the extent to which the Argentine military council, especially General Jorge Isaac Anaya, had control over the decision of President Galtieri. After the negotiations are agreed upon, as happened in Hague's first trip,

then his position will be weakened, which will lead to the failure of the entire negotiation process. Accordingly, and after consultations with the Military Council, Secretary of State Hague met with Costa Mendes at half past ten in the evening. This matter was completely unacceptable to the British side, as it put matters back to square one, and this is what Hague wrote to President Reagan on April 17, when he told him ((that the Argentine minister spoke to me tonight in an unacceptable language .... It has also become clear that we are dealing with people who are not well-meaning and are not in a position to negotiate) (FRUS, 1982), Hague assured Reagan that everything that is agreed upon is being sabotaged by members of the junta, especially Navy Minister Jorge Anaya, who is hard on the war, as he is still convinced that Britain is not ready to fight for islands far from it, and at the end of his telegram Hague wrote that Secretary of State Mendes told him To meet with him tomorrow, and if he did not get anything at that time to continue, he will return to Washington, as his going to London is useless (FRUS, 1982). In response, Reagan replied to Secretary Hague in a cable from the White House on April 17, in which he made clear his feeling that the Argentine president lacked the strength to make the junta acquiesce in serious negotiations, and stressed that the Argentine proposals were unacceptable to the British side, and entrusted Hague to explain to the Argentine side. , that the United States is very disappointed about the lack of clear progress from the Argentine side regarding negotiations and finding a peaceful settlement of the crisis, and that there must be a serious intention regarding peace and security for the two countries (FRUS, 1982). As scheduled, Hague met with Foreign Minister Costa Mendes the next day, when he was presented with what came in Reagan's last telegram. Accordingly, Mendes asked Hague for another meeting with President Galtieri, and the meeting took place again, and after negotiations that lasted twelve hours, he reached The two parties agreed to a draft not different from its predecessors, containing three items: an immediate cessation of military actions in the islands, the withdrawal of the Argentine army from them, the maintenance of an Argentine administrative presence on them, and the termination of negotiations on December 31, by obtaining Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands (FRUS, 1982). As a result, Hague sent a telegram to President Reagan stating, "I think we have come to the end with Argentina and that Mrs. Thatcher will not accept this text, as it does not conform to what I pledged before the British Parliament." And as agreed, Hague returned to Washington after his tour, failed negotiations with Argentina, as he felt the futility of his travel to London to discuss proposals that had been discussed and rejected by the British side on his first trip (FRUS, 1982). After Hague's frustration and failure with the Argentine side, he wrote to British Foreign Secretary Francis Pym what had been reached in the negotiations, expressing his regret for the lack of Argentine concession. He saw that Argentina does not deserve any concession in return for its excessive intransigence on the issue of sovereignty (FRUS, 1982). The British Foreign Secretary responded to this, writing to him: "It is clear that your valiant efforts have been rejected, as the Argentine side is committed to the use of force, and we are deeply disturbed by their stubbornness." Despite this, Hague did not stop finding a peaceful way out of the crisis, as he asked Bim should visit Washington in order to reach a quick solution before the military clash, which has become very close, due to the proximity of the British fleet to the South Georgia islands. (FRUS,



1982), It is worth noting that despite all the resentment of the United States of America and Britain, Argentina did not change its position, and was insistent on its ideas. Foreign Minister Costa Mendes sent a telegram to Hague on April 21, praising his efforts in mediating between the two countries, and insisting on The proposals of the last draft presented by the Military Council, especially the issue of Argentine sovereignty over the islands (FRUS, 1982), Francis Beam arrived in Washington on April 22, and after a number of meetings that lasted for two days, Hague reminded Reagan, that Britain did not agree to the last draft just as it rejects any Argentine presence on the islands, whether military for the time being or administrative during the negotiation period, and instead of Bem suggested that Argentina be represented in the administration of the islands by persons from the United States of America. At the same time, Hague obtained information from the British ambassador, Henderson, that Thatcher was intent on retaking the islands of South Georgia in a very short time (FRUS, 1982), and accordingly Haig tried That the Argentine foreign minister threatens that military actions from the British side are very close, and that the United States of America should not stand by, but should have a position and that it is close to standing by Britain (FRUS, 1982), Accordingly, Britain began its military operations on April 26, recovering the islands of South Georgia, and as a last attempt by Hague, on April 27, he presented a number of proposals to Argentina that would avoid war and defeat in the Falklands, but the last proposals also failed, as President Galtieri announced The British side had used force, and Argentina would respond with force as well. Surprisingly enough, the Argentine president told US Ambassador Shlodman that he could not understand why the US Secretary of State, with all his resources, could not prevent Mrs. Thatcher from launching this attack, so that we can solve the crisis by peaceful means!) ( FRUS, 1982), In the meantime, the pro-British voices escalated inside the United States of America, and the internal opposition to Hague's continued mediation between the two sides escalated. The British Ambassador Henderson also played a prominent role within the United States of America in preparing public opinion to support Britain through his media statements and his exit on most prominent media channels (Max, 1987), in addition to that (ABC) News Agency has conducted a survey about the party who It should be supported by Washington after the outbreak of hostilities, and the poll was in favor of Britain with 61% (FRUS, 1982). Thus, as a result of Argentina's rejection of the latest proposals and as a result of internal pressure on the Reagan administration, the latter wrote a letter to Thatcher on April 29 in which he stated (((In light of recent military and diplomatic developments, and as a result of Argentina's rejection of the American proposals, we will issue a statement on Friday, April 30, to let you know the position of the United States). Before issuing that statement, Hague sent a direct threat to Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendes on April 29, warning him that the safety of American citizens in Argentina would be harmed, and if that happened, the response would be swift. And overwhelming (FRUS, 1982), and this is evidence that the United States of America is set to take a step on the side of Britain, so it tried to protect American citizens who might be subjected to a reaction from the angry Argentine people. Accordingly, President Reagan ordered the meeting of the US National Security Council on Friday morning, April 30, 1982, as the Council decided to join Britain's side and help it in the war against Argentina, and that assistance

includes all intelligence and military measures except for direct military intervention, and Reagan ordered at the end The meeting, Secretary Haig made a press statement explaining the position of the United States of America on the war (FRUS, 1982), In implementation of this, Hague announced at eleven thirty in the morning his press statement, in which he explained the diplomatic efforts of the United States of America and its efforts to find a peaceful solution for the two parties. It prevented any significant success, and thus Argentina is considered an aggressor country through illegal and legal means, and this required the United States of America to take a firm stance against such aggressive acts, and accordingly the United States of America stopped all economic and military aid and bank guarantees allocated to Argentina, and in In return, the US administration extends its support to the British side on all levels, except for direct military intervention in the islands (FRUS, 1982),

### **Conclusion**

Through the research, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- 1- The occupation of the Falklands by Argentina constituted a political crisis within the American administration, and this was evident during the meeting of the National Security Council on April 7, 1982, and if this indicates anything, it indicates the depth of the relationship that binds the United States between Argentina and Britain.
- 2- From the foregoing, it is clear that Argentina was obstructing Alexander Haig's attempts to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis, and perhaps the reason for this is the Argentine people's insistence on recovering the islands, which put the Argentine military council in a difficult position that made it unable to retreat from the occupation of the islands.
- 3- Although the United States of America declared neutrality and did not take sides with either side, it became clear that the American administration was more inclined towards Britain, perhaps due to the deep relationship that linked the two countries during various historical times.
- 4- The failure of Alexander Haig's negotiations and his failure to reach a significant result, shows us the depth and development of the crisis between the two sides, which made him reach a dead end that led to the outbreak of war later.

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